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This paper revisits the empirical trade literature on East–West trade in the early 1990s and provides 
a replication of the traditional gravity fi ndings of that period with the Baier–Bergstrand version 
of the model, providing thereby better estimates of the trade hindering impact of the Cold War by 
including multilateral and world resistance factors and simultaneously considering country fi xed ef-
fects. Breaking down the Cold War Walls increased world trade by 2.7% of world GDP. The replica-
tion with the Baier–Bergstrand model also reveals that Cold War trade distortions also signifi cantly 
impacted China’s trade with the West.
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A quarter of a century ago, a significant change in the world economic system 
occurred. During the Cold War, trade on the European continent had been sub-
stantially distorted both by (a) the Communist reliance on self-sufficiency, (b) 
the difficulties imposed by the East’s lack of hard and convertible currency, (c) 
the West imposing embargoes on dual use and technologically advanced goods, 
and (d) more subtle political barriers to trade. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
Iron Curtain in 1989 did not only ensure that people could travel freely, but also 
removed the political barriers to trade. The impact of the breakdown of these 
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“Cold War Walls” went far beyond the breakdown of the visible wall between 
the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe. Arguably, the invisible political and 
institutional differences that constituted invisible barriers to trade may have mat-
tered the most. Indeed, for a number of years, double-digit growth rates char-
acterised the trade flows from Eastern to Western Europe and from Western to 
Eastern Europe (Figure 1; Agudelo – Davidson 2006; Afman – Maurel 2010). 
The break-up of a number of formerly communist nations (the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia) into several new countries1 and the unification2 
of the BRD (West Germany) and the DDR (East Germany) into the Germany that 
we know today complicate the analysis, but still, it is clear that the trade between 
Eastern and Western Europe increased many-fold and did so at a pace that was 
much faster than foreseen by even optimistic observers in 1989. Interestingly, 
trade economists were keen to point out the impact of the end of the Cold War 
for the European continent, but were less sharp regarding the impact in the Asian 
theatre where Cold War Walls were also crumbling. 
25 years later, under the spell of the Crimean crisis, this article takes a fresh 
look at the empirical trade literature on East–West trade in the early 1990s in or-
der to find out whether trade economists who, on the one hand, competently dealt 
with the consequences of the end of the political and diplomatic trade barriers that 
were associated with the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain, may, on the other hand, 
have overlooked the consequences of the crumbling of a similar but less visible 
barrier to trade, namely the external trade relationships of China. China’s external 
trade was also characterised by double-digit growth rates. An example is Sino-
South Korean trade that was negligible in the 1980s, but showed very large gains 
in the 1990s and 2000s (Chung 2009; see also Kaplinsky – Messner 2008 on the 
slow and broad based integration of China in the global political and economic 
system; Bussière – Schnatz 2006 for an empirical analysis of the advent of China; 
and Flores-Macias – Kreps 2013 for an analysis of Chinese trade and political re-
lations across Latin America and Africa). For the lack of a better metaphor, I will 
refer to this invisible wall as the Chinese Wall. As will become clear, autarky, lack 
of convertible currency, formal embargoes, and more subtle diplomatic barriers 
to trade – as in the case of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain – significantly 
suppressed China’s foreign trade.
I investigate the issue of the impact of walls deploying two different method-
ologies. First, I will use the framework of the earliest econometric investigation 
of the potential trade impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain 
1  See Fidrmuc – Fidrmuc (2003) on economic disintegration.
2  See Nitch – Wolf (2013) for a gravity analysis of the German unification and the persistent 
effects of the Berlin Wall even after its demolition.
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(van Bergeijk – Oldersma 1990).3 Second, I will use the modern reformulation of 
the gravity equation that comprises multilateral resistance terms as introduced by 
Anderson – van Wincoop (2003). More specifically, I will use the Baier – Berg-
strand (2009, 2010) version of the gravity model and include multilateral and 
world resistance, detect country and region-specific effects that may be subdued 
in fixed effects gravity models and provide comparative statistics regarding the 
disappearance of walls consistent with general equilibrium.
This article moves beyond the stage of simple replication, although replica-
tion in itself is already useful since better estimates for Gross Domestic Product 
exist than those that were available in early 1990 and because the estimation 
technology has greatly improved, in particular due to the methodological inno-
vations following Anderson – van Wincoop (2003). The original contributions 
of this paper are threefold. First, this article provides a better and more exact 
estimation of the trade hindering impact of the Cold War Walls due to both the 
inclusion of multilateral and world resistance factors and the simultaneous con-
sideration of country fixed effects. Second, this article provides simulations of 
the economic impact of the removal of Cold War Walls. Third, by doing so, the 
article uncovers and illustrates some of the basic economics of walls in an em-
pirically relevant context. 
3  The article originally appeared in Dutch as Normalisering van het OostWest handelsverkeer. 
Economisch Statistische Berichten (ESB), 12 December 1989, 74 (Nr. 3737), pp. 1244–1246.
Figure 1.Total real growth of trade with OECD (1990–92)
Source: OECD (1993), Table 25, p. 122 
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The remainder of this article is organised as follows. The next section sets out 
the groundwork for the methodology and the analysis as it reviews the literature 
on the impact of the breakdown of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain in the ear-
ly 1990s. As will become clear, the empirical analyses in the 1990s relied heavily 
on the so-called gravity analysis. I discuss this model, pay attention to some of 
the recent applications that deal with the impact of invisible trade barriers such as 
trust and cultural and institutional factors, and examine methodological innova-
tions. Section 2 sets out the empirical approach and deals with data issues (the 
latter is especially relevant because the communist economies reported statistical 
aggregates that differed substantially from the concepts that are used in market 
economies, such as GDP). Section 3 discusses the econometric results of two ver-
sions of the gravity equation that are used to investigate the impact of the Cold 
War Walls. Section 4 uses the gravity parameter estimates for 1988 in simulations 
that investigate the impact of both the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain, and the 
“invisible” Chinese Wall. Section 5 summarises the main findings and draws a 
number of methodological lessons that are relevant for research on the economics 
of walls and policy.
1. ON GRAVITY
It was recognised early on that walls typically distort economic exchanges be-
tween locations on either side of the wall and that the analysis of any wall thus 
essentially has to deal with the geography of economic activity. A useful research 
tool to describe the geographical patterns of bilateral economic exchange and 
interaction between economic agents is the gravity model. 
The gravity model is most often applied to international bilateral trade and in-
vestment, but many more applications exist (see van Bergeijk – Brakman 2010 for 
the state-of-the-art). The gravity model derives its name from its similarity with 
the Newtonian Law of Gravity as the simple and very intuitive idea of this model 
is that economic masses interact more strongly if they are large and/or in close 
range of one another. Economic gravity rests on an elementary concept: bilateral 
interaction increases in the economic masses of the trade partners and decreases 
in the distance between the trade partners. This simple idea has now been used 
for six decades to analyse bilateral trade flows with remarkably good statistical 
performance and robust results regarding the main drivers of and obstacles to 
international trade. Importantly, the gravity approach fitted the research questions 
of one of the biggest natural experiments of the 1990s quite well. Breuss – Egger 
(1999: 82) argue that “the opening up of Eastern Europe in 1989 revealed a new 
field of application for the gravity approach”. Also, in view of the gravity model’s 
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excellent empirical and statistical performance, it was no surprise that this model 
became the most important tool to analyse the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the Iron Curtain. 
1.1. Literature of the 1990s
The most striking reaction amongst Western policy makers to the collapse of 
Communism in 1989 was a common disbelief in the trade potential of Eastern 
Europe.4 The popular perception was that the quality of products from Eastern 
Europe was simply insufficient to meet international competition. This percep-
tion was built both on the a-typical pattern of international specialisation that 
existed within the CMEA and on the low volume of trade between East and West 
(and vice versa). Also, the widespread inefficiency of production was used to 
support the argument that exports from Eastern Europe could not be competitive 
on OECD markets. 5
Still, the applied trade research at that time revealed that major shifts in trade 
patterns were eminent, essentially because researchers recognised the validity of 
the key concept of comparative advantage, that is, that international trade is also 
beneficial for countries that are inefficient in the production of all goods (these 
countries have absolute disadvantage in all goods). These countries can specialise 
in the good(s) or industry/industries in which they are relatively least inefficient 
and this provides opportunities for mutual beneficial trade. Breaking down Cold 
War Walls enabled the start of this process, although obviously more would be 
needed in order to make real progress. So while it was a priori unknown how 
long it would take before the trade benefits of the breakdown of the Berlin Wall 
and the Iron Curtain would emerge, it was beyond doubt that trade potential in-
creased due to the removal of these manmade barriers to trade.
Most researchers (e.g., Havrylyshyn – Pritchett 1991; Wang – Winters 1991; 
Döhrn – Milton 1992; Ezran et al. 1992; Hamilton – Winters 1992) estimated the 
gravity model for a large number of countries and used the parameters and the 
observed distances, GDPs, and populations to calculate the “normal” trade levels 
for each of the CMEA countries. Next, conclusions were drawn from the com-
parison of the actually observed trade flows and the “normal” or predicted trade 
4  Many policy makers thus opted for unrealistic plans to supply Eastern European countries 
with enormous capital injections (van Bergeijk – Lensink 1993).
5  In those years, it was often asked what kind of products the Eastern European countries would 
be exporting. It took some time before the convincing answer was found: “non-traditional 
exports”. 
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flows. In particular, the studies predicted that a turnaround would occur in the 
geographical pattern of trade: the share of Northern Europe in the trade of Eastern 
Europe would increase from 25%–30% to 70%–75%. With hindsight, these stud-
ies were very helpful for understanding and predicting the enormous trade reori-
entation due to the fall of the Berlin Wall (as part of the Iron Curtain’s collapse). 
One drawback, however, is that these studies (while rightly indicating the shifts 
in the relative geographical patterns, especially in Europe) did not investigate (or 
report) the increase in global and regional trade potential. 
The procedure in van Bergeijk – Oldersma (1990) differs from the basic meth-
odology in the other studies of the 1990s, because it directly estimated the impact 
of the Wall by means of a dummy variable rather than by deriving the impact 
from a comparison between actual and predicted trade flows as was done by most 
authors. Instead, the estimated gravity model was used to simulate post-Cold War 
trade patterns, avoiding many measurement and interpretation problems and at 
the same time arriving at indications of changes of trade potentials around the 
globe.
1.2. Literature on the “new” trade barriers
It is relevant to review some of the new avenues in the empirical literature be-
cause this line of research substantiates the idea that “unseen walls” exist and 
that these invisible (or at least not directly observable) barriers to trade can exert 
a strong impact in the real economy. Of course, these manners of barriers have 
always existed, but they remained unobserved because transportation costs were 
exerting a much stronger impact on trade. The substantial reductions in the costs 
of transportation and communication (travel and exchange of ideas) in recent dec-
ades have removed that veil. Indeed, although the “death of distance” has been 
claimed many times in the popular press on globalisation, a persistent finding in 
the application of gravity models is that distance continues to matter and that the 
importance of this factor increased in recent decades (see the meta-analysis by 
Disdier – Head 2008). Recent studies therefore focus on other forms of distance 
effects related to indirectly observed differences in trust, value systems (cultural 
norms), and institutional quality, often uncovering very significant impacts on 
trade flows (Table 1). The message conveyed by Table 1 is that invisible barriers 
clearly matter.
A second, more recent strand of literature is relevant for the issue of invisible, 
politically inspired barriers to trade deals with the impact of economic diplomacy 
(negative and positive political interactions between countries). This literature 
was pioneered in the 1980s and 1990s, and at that time it studied so-called events 
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data and intensively used gravity models (see van Bergeijk 1994 and 2009, Chap-
ter 2 for a detailed review of that literature). In the mid-2000s, the topic returned 
on the research agenda again, but was more focused on concrete structures (such 
as the network of embassies and consulates) and activities (such as state visits). 
Again, most analyses used gravity as a basic concept. Moons – van Bergeijk 
(2013) provide a meta-analysis of 24 studies covering both the early and the re-
cent studies reaffirming that diplomacy exerts a strong impact on trade.
2. EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND DATA ISSUES
The empirical design firstly deploys the basic equation of van Bergeijk – Old-
ersma (1990), Wang – Winters (1991), and Hamilton – Winters (1992), who all 
relate exports to GDPs, populations, and distance. Using this traditional form, 
I first estimate cross country a gravity model for the global pattern of bilater-
al trade from 1988 data in which politically induced distortions in the bilateral 
Chinese and East–West trade flows are modelled by dummy variables:
             lnEij = c + αlnYi + βlnYj + γ lnDij + δlnNi + ζ lnNj + ηWij + + ij (1)
where  Eij = exports of country i to country j
Yx  = GDP of country x
Nx  = population of country x
Dij  = distance between capitals of country i and j
Wij =  dummy variable for bilateral trade flow between country i and j that 
crosses wall
 = error term.
Table 1
Impact of a one standard deviation change in intangible trade barriers on exports (% change)
Increase in trust 24–38 a,b,c
Decrease in cultural diversity –14–8 a,d,e
Increase in institutional quality 22–45 d
Source: Adapted from van den Berg et al. (2008), Table 3.6, pp. 37–38.
Notes: a Dekker et al. (2006), b den Butter – Mosch (2003), c Guiso et al. (2004), d Linders et al. (2005), 
e Lankhuizen et al. (2008).
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Secondly, I estimate the Baier and Bergstrand (2010) gravity equation treating 
the Wall as a trade cost factor:6
     = c – (1 – σ)ρlnDij – λ (1 – σ)Wij + (1 – σ)ρmwrDij + λ (1 – σ)mwrWij + ij (2)
       where  2
1 1 1 1
1 1 1N N N N
ij ij ij ij
j i i i
mwrD lnD lnD lnD
N N N   
                   and
            
2
1 1 1 1
1 1 1N N N N
ij ij ij ij
j i i i
mwrW W W W
N N N   
                   .
I add country fixed effects to equation 2 in order to capture country (exporter 
or importer) specific effects, including population size, similarity of languages, 
landlocked or island status, etc. Many explanatory variables could be added to 
this equation (as is common practice in most traditional gravity analyses). I am, 
however, interested in a simulation and only need a reasonably good approxi-
mation for the key determinants of the network of world trade. For that reason, 
I want to focus on geography (distance) and on the time variant variables GDP 
(equations 1 and 2) and population (equation 1), and incorporate fixed effects 
to deal with other factors. Being an island, for example, will not change during 
the simulations and can thus be ignored in the simulations. Importantly, one 
of the most commonly applied explanatory variables (adjacency or a common 
border between nations) is problematic in my investigation because this would 
cause problems with the German unification (Poland, for example, became Ger-
many’s neighbour in addition to the disappearance of the Berlin Wall and the 
Iron Curtain, including the splitting up of countries such as the Soviet Union so 
that it would be difficult to logically distinguish the contributions of adjacency 
and wall).7
6  I follow Baier – Bergstrand (2010: 104–105) and calculate the multilateral and world resis-
tance factors using equal weights (1/N) rather than GDP-share weights. Baier – Bergstrand 
(2010: 109–114) provide extensive Monte Carlo analyses in support of this approximation, 
finding very small bias (less than 0.5%). 
7  The German unification and the break-up of the USSR in 1991 and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 are factors that 
make a panel analysis or a before-after analysis impossible, because domestic trade changes 
into international trade and vice versa.
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2.1. Country coverage
The country coverage is almost the same selection as the one that was originally 
made in 1990 by van Bergeijk and Oldersma and is guided by the considerations 
to cover the most important trading nations, all continents, different economic 
systems and levels of development. With hindsight, that selection was rather 
lucky since almost all G20 countries are on board, in particular the country group 
known nowadays as the BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and 
South Africa).
The country sample covers Algeria, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, BRD, 
Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, DDR, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, 
France, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, USA, USSR/Russia, Venezuela, and 
Yugoslavia.
2.2. Trade
Clearly, a dataset that deals with history needs to take into account that countries 
have disappeared since the 1990s. In addition, since I want to study the invisible 
Chinese Wall, I want to include Taiwan for obvious reasons. These requirements 
imply that I cannot use data sources that only use countries that are identified in 
the last ISO country list (as, for example, is the case with the Head and Mayer da-
taset that is available from CEPII) or that I have to be politically correct and thus 
exclude Taiwan (such as trade data sets provided by the international organisa-
tions). For these reasons, I use Gleditsch’s comprehensive trade data set, although 
it does not provide data on Hong Kong.8 The trade data relate to 1988 exports. 
Due to the logarithmic transformation, the model cannot handle zero flows (no 
bilateral trade) and therefore an arbitrary linear transformation was performed 
adding the threshold value ($0.5 million) to all export flows by van Bergeijk – 
Oldersma (1990). In contrast, I exclude the zero flows because the problem is 
very limited in my dataset (65 flows or 3%) but, more importantly, because more 
than half of the zero trade cases involve South Africa due to far reaching official 
sanctions and consumer boycotts against apartheid, and given the very specific 
reason for these zero flows, I do not want to consider these in the estimations. 
8  Available at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html; see also Gleditsch 2002.
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2.3. GDP and population
I rely on Maddison’s historical series for population in 1000s and GDP per capita 
(in millions of 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars). Van Bergeijk – Old-
ersma (1990) use PPP data from the International Comparisons Project, but I 
prefer Maddison’s data for three reasons.9 First, Maddison’s benchmark year is 
closer to the year of observation for the data (1990 vs. 1985 or 1996 for the ICP). 
Second, both my models relate to GDP and international trade, and thus are best 
served by a method that does not correct for differences in purchasing power due 
to different prices for non-traded goods as is done in the ICP. Third, ICP uses 
procedures to ensure consistency of levels at benchmark years and growth rates 
between benchmark years. I am not interested in growth rates of GDP, but in GDP 
levels at a specific point in time that is close to Maddison’s benchmark. Hence the 
choice for the data set of Angus Maddison’s Statistics on World Population, GDP 
and Per Capita GDP, 1–2008 AD. This source is also known as “Maddison’s 
historical series” and is available from the website of the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre (www.ggdc.net). Although this dataset provides data for 
communist states and their derivatives and successor states in case of the collapse 
of a nation, Maddison does not provide the data for DDR and BRD, but simply 
seems to have aggregated them into one number for “Germany”. Luckily, his 
1995 study (pp. 130–132) provides details on his treatment of the two Germanies, 
so that I can reconstruct the data for BRD and DDR in 1988. 
2.4. Distance
I follow van Bergeijk – Oldersma (1990) and measure distance as the crow flies 
using basic geometrics. Distances are calculated from the degrees of longitude 
and latitude of the capital cities of the trade partners in 1988. Assume the Earth to 
be a perfect sphere with a circumference of 40,000 kilometres. The coordinates 
of a point on the unit sphere are 
x = sinθ × cosφ,  
y =sinθ × sinφ and  
z = cosθ, 
9  The choice for Maddison’s data rather than the ICP data that were used originally in van Ber-
geijk – Oldersma (1990) also reflects that the developments of countries that no longer exist 
are not reported in recent vintages of the Penn World Tables.
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where θ is the normalised latitude 0 ≤ θ ≤ π and φ is the normalised longitude 
0 ≤ φ ≤ 2π. The angle α between the vectors a = [x, y, z] and a’ = [x. y. z’] can be 
obtained from cos α = a × a’ and α < π. The shortest distance between the two 
points over the surface of the globe is roughly 20,000α/π.
2.5. Walls
My walls are not made of bricks and mortar, but are dummy variables that as-
sume the value 1 if countries are on opposite sides of the Wall and 0 if they are on 
the same side of the Wall. I let the data decide about the strength of the Wall: the 
estimated coefficients for this dummy provide an indication of both the statistical 
significance and the economic importance of the Wall.
3. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
For comparison, the results of van Bergeijk – Oldersma (1990) are reported in 
the first column of Table 2. The econometric results for a similar traditional grav-
ity equation are reported in the second column of Table 2; the Baier–Bergstrand 
gravity model is reported in columns 4 and 5. In column 6, I add dummy vari-
ables for colonial ties and common language and their respective world and mul-
tilateral resistance terms in the same way that I added the wall dummies. As 
pointed out by one of the referees, the two bilateral variables in the model are 
distance and the “Wall” dummy, which means that everything not captured by 
distance could influence the estimated wall parameters. Column 6 thus provides 
a robustness check by including additional controls that are clearly not elements 
of Cold War “Walls”.10
Focussing on the traditional model first (columns 2 and 3), we can observe that 
the replication of Van Bergeijk – Oldersma (column 2) is quite close for another 
year (1988 versus 1985) with different data sources and a different sample of 
countries.11 About two-thirds of the variance are explained and the coefficients 
are of similar size as reported by van Bergeijk – Oldersma and highly significant. 
10  Data sources are Mayer – Zignago (2011) for (ex-)colonial ties and Melitz – Toubal (2012) for 
common languages.
11  I had to leave Iceland out because Maddison does not provide data on its GDP and Hong Kong 
is integrated in the Chinese trade statistics in the 1988 trade data base that I use and for that 
reason drops out.
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In column 3, I add the Chinese Wall dummy, but that turns out to be completely 
insignificant. 
Next, we turn to the Baier–Bergstrand model in columns 4 to 6. Note, that the 
reported coefficient for distance now is –(1 – σ)ρ so that it considers the relative 
distance effect (that is, vis-à-vis multilateral and world distance) and has been 
estimated under the restriction that lnDij and mwrDij have identical effects with 
opposite signs. Likewise, the reported coefficient for a wall is –λ(1 – σ) and has 
Table 2 
OLS estimates for bilateral trade flows countries (49 countries in 1985 and 48 countries in 1988)
van 
Bergeijk – 
Oldersma 
(1990)
Replication
(present study) Baier–Bergstrand gravity model
Based on data for
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1985 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988
Dependent 
variable
lnEij lnEij lnEij
ln
Eij
Y Yi j
    
ln
Eij
Y Yi j
      
ln
Eij
Y Yi j
    
GNP exporter 1.8
(36.9)
1.6
(36.0)
1.6
(35.9)
GNP importer 1.4
(28.7)
1.4
(30.9)
1.4
(30.8)
Population 
exporter
–1.0
(–23.5)
–0.9
(–22.7)
–0.8
(–22.1)
Population 
importer
–0.6
(–14.4)
–0.6
(–16.7)
–0.6
(–16.3)
Distance –1.0
(–30.6)
–0.9
(–27.3)
–0.9
(–27.3)
–1.0
(–26.0)
–1.0
(–16.7)
–1.0
(–25.3)
Common lan-
guage
0.3
(2.2)
Colonial history 0.6
(2.6)
Berlin Wall and 
Iron Curtain 
–2.1
(–29.8)
–1.3
(–19.2)
–1.3
(–19.2)
–1.7
(–20.0)
–1.7
(–19.5)
–1.7
(–19.4)
Chinese Wall –0.2
(–0.9)
–0.5
(–1.8)
–0.5
(–1.7)
Constant –3.8
(–18.7)
–9.0
(–17.1)
–9.1
(–17)
Fixed 
effects 
included
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.72 0.72 0.72
Note: t-values in brackets.
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been estimated under the same restriction. Similarly to the traditional gravity 
model, the Baier–Bergstrand gravity model finds highly significant coefficients 
for distance and the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain, but in contrast to the traditional 
approach also a significant effect of the Chinese Wall (the significance level is 
modest at 92% but still sufficient). So while the conclusion of the Van Bergeijk 
– Oldersma replication suggests that the invisible Chinese Wall can and perhaps 
should be ignored, the Baier–Bergstrand model that considers multilateral and 
world aspects of both distance and of the walls shows that the invisible Chinese 
Wall is a significant barrier to trade. Column 6 reports a robustness check that 
also includes dummy variables and multilateral and world resistance terms for 
common language and (ex-)colonial ties. The robustness check supports the ear-
lier findings.
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
The next step is to calculate the comparative statics multipliers as 
*
– (1–Df )( 1)
1
ij
ij
mwrW
ij
E
E e λ 
  
for each Cold War Wall and use these multipliers to predict each 
bilateral trade flow, that is, the level that would result in the absence of the wall. 
The simulations cover direct and indirect trade effects (for example, the removal 
of a wall does not only stimulate trade between the previously opposing sides of 
the wall, but may also make some previous suppliers less attractive). The simula-
tions do not include dynamic effects (for example on long-term growth). The 
simulation results are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Simulation of the impact of Cold War Walls in 1988 (trade increase in percent of regional GDP)
Berlin Wall Chinese Wall  Cold War Walls
Africa 1.0 0.0 1.0
Asia, excluding China 1.6 0.2 1.8
China 0.1 0.6 0.7
Australia, New Zealand 2.2 0.2 2.4
Eastern Europe and USSR 28.1 0.0 27.7
Latin America 0.7 0.0 0.7
Middle East 1.3 0.1 1.3
North America 1.0 0.1 1.1
West Europe 4.3 0.1 4.4
World 2.6 0.1 2.7
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The results confirm the importance of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain as 
their statistical significance is also reflected in economic significance, but for the 
Chinese Wall the impact is generally speaking quite modest. Breaking down the 
Cold War Walls according to my calculations increased world trade by 2.7% of 
world GDP (that is about a third of the increase in global trade openness since 
1990). Typically, the trade impact is especially strong at the regional level close 
to the wall. Figure 2 compares the regional impact to the global impact (using 
trade potential in per cent of GDP). Interestingly, Figure 2 does not only show 
relatively strong impacts for the regions that are closest to the respective wall, 
but also finds relatively strong impacts (that is: above the world average) for the 
Chinese Wall in Western Europe.
The findings for 1988 do not necessarily mean that the removal of the invisible 
Chinese Wall, while statistically significant, is economically less significant from 
a historic perspective. Indeed, it is probable that the regional conditions in this 
particular case in 1989 were such that trade would be low both with and without 
walls. In other words, walls cannot distort economic non-activity. An indication, 
however, of the potential impact of the “invisible Chinese Wall” is that, as il-
lustrated in Figure 2, its relative influence in terms of percentage trade reduction 
was, comparatively speaking, strong in developed but far away markets in West-
ern Europe. This suggests that the “invisible Chinese Wall” could have started to 
bite once development in Asia took off. 
Figure 2. Ratio of regional to world-wide impact (trade increase in percent of GDP)
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The results in the previous section should not be seen as accurate predictions 
(Breuss – Egger 1999), but rather as a serious attempt to uncover the size of the 
potential impact of a wall that played a major role in recent history. We know 
from observation that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain led to an 
enormous surge in intra-European trade. This observation and the fact that this 
trade potential was ex ante indicated by a number of gravity analyses in the 1990s 
motivated a revisit of the empirical trade literature on East–West trade in order 
to find out if trade economists who, on the one hand, competently dealt with the 
consequences of political and diplomatic trade barriers that were associated with 
the very visible Berlin Wall (and the Iron Curtain), may, on the other hand, have 
overlooked the consequences of invisible – and more gradual – reductions of 
similar barriers to trade, in particular in the external trade relationships of China. 
In view of the findings in this paper, the signals that important changes in China’s 
trade were statistically strong, but the short- to medium-term economic implica-
tions were weak at most. 
The empirical analysis of the world trade system just before the end of the 
Cold War provides some useful numerical illustrations of general patterns regard-
ing the economic impact of walls. First, walls are not mirrors as illustrated by 
the different consequences of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain for Western 
and Eastern Europe. The economics of walls thus should consider the possibility 
of asymmetries, in particular because the costs of walls and the benefits of their 
removal can be distributed quite unevenly between the two sides of the wall. 
Second, the two simulations clarify that the impact of walls depends on local 
conditions on both sides of the wall, but also on the opportunities that exist for 
economic interaction with and between entities in wall-free locations. Third, al-
though the impact of walls is obviously the strongest the closest one is to the wall, 
their impact beyond the local level will often be not negligible as shown by the 
impact of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain in Australia and New Zealand.
New walls in Europe – even invisible walls – are still much more difficult to 
conceive than before 1961 when the Berlin Wall was erected, but at the same time 
one is aware that in the present geopolitical context, a political conflict could 
recreate significant look-alikes of the Cold War Walls. This article illustrates the 
important economic costs that would occur in such a scenario.
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